Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
T he use of retail sales taxes began in the 1930s; it is now used by 46 states, 33 of which allow a local option rate, generally piggybacked on the state base (Due and Mikesell, 1994) . State revenue departments must rely heavily on vendors to collect the tax at the point of purchase in order to make it administratively practical. This reliance on vendors is necessary because it would be infeasible for state revenue departments to collect retail sales taxes on "countless" transactions on their own. The process is straightforward for instate vendors who are required to collect the tax during the sales transaction and remit the proceeds to state tax authorities.
1 Use tax legislation attempts to make out-of-state vendors equally responsible for the collection and remittance of sales tax revenue as in-state vendors (Mazerov and Lev, 1998 (386 U.S. 753,1967) and Quill v. North Dakota (504 U.S. 298, 1992) . One of the compelling arguments in both cases was the assertion that it was not practical to expect vendors to maintain the records needed to accurately collect the tax at the point of sale because of the large number of and variation in local sales and use tax rates within and among states.
The recently completed National Tax Association Project on Electronic Commerce (Project) recommended that state and local governments lessen the compliance burden by adopting within each state a single statewide sales and use tax rate (National Tax Association, 1999) . 3 This recommendation has important implications for both state and local governments and its acceptance will require considerable debate and dialogue (Mackey, 1999) . 4 The recommendation that state and local sales tax rates be modified to reduce compliance concerns has been raised in the past: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) (1986), Hartman (1986) , Mackey (1998) , Fox (1998) , Mikesell (1999) , and National League of Cities (1999) . The ACIR (1986) actually recommended that states adopt a single rate for mail-order sales. Bills introduced in the U.S. Senate by Walter Mondale [S. 2811 (1973) ] and Dale Bumpers [S. 545 (1995) ] included provisions for a uniform rate on out-of-state sales. However, none of the aforementioned proposals went as far as the Project to recommend a single statewide rate for both in-state and out-of-state sales. And, despite numerous proposals for rate uniformity, surprisingly there has been little reported analysis of the feasibility of such an approach.
This article examines the issues surrounding the implementation of this recommendation. The article proceeds as follows. We first describe the use of multiple local option sales and use tax rates, summarizing the number of rates, the types of governments that are allowed to employ sales taxes, and the use of the funds. Next, we discuss issues associated with moving to one rate. We then turn to case studies that analyze the potential implementation of one rate in five diverse states, California, Georgia, New York, Tennessee, and Utah. 5 The case studies encapsulate the fiscal and policy problems concomitant with simplifying rates in each state. The final section contains our conclusions and observations. Before beginning our discussions and to put the issues around a single rate proposal into perspective, we highlight the fiscal importance and complexity of state and local sales taxes. Since 1960, real per capita sales tax revenue has increased four-fold, although the growth has been much slower in the 1990s than in earlier decades ( Table 1 ). The importance of sales tax revenue relative to own source revenue and tax revenue has increased since 1960 for both state and local governments, but much more so for local governments. For the five states considered below, there are substantial differences, both across the states and between the state and local governments within a state, in the importance of sales tax revenue, whether expressed in per capita terms or as a share of other revenue, as well as differences in the growth of real sales tax revenue per capita (Table 2) . However, even with these differences sales taxes are important at the state and local level in each of the five states we analyze in this article
COMPLEXITY OF MULTIPLE RATES 6
Initially, permission to levy local sales and use taxes was only extended to cities and to some counties, and the rates were low and generally uniform within a state (Committee of the Judiciary, 1965). Subsequently, authority to impose sales taxes has been extended to other types of local governments, that often are overlapping; the use of the local sales tax has grown. Initially the revenue from local sales taxes was used to support general purpose government activities, but now it is often earmarked. In a few cases, like sports complexes and mass transit systems, this revenue may be used to guarantee debt (Keating, 1999) . Local sales taxes are also used to support education in states such as Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee (Dayton, 1998) . As Table 3 demonstrates, the existing structure of local sales taxes nationwide is diverse and complex. 7 The costs of complying with such a complex structure are onerous, especially for outof-state vendors. The most logical way to reduce these costs is to promote more uniformity among local sales taxes nationwide. Yet, movement toward more uniformity will pose a number of significant challenges, including the possibility of lost revenue, the sacrifice of some state and local autonomy over this important revenue source, legal restrictions, and political opposition. However, uniformity promises some benefits such as protecting the sales tax base from erosion due to out-of-state sales and reducing administration and compliance costs.
COMPLEXITY OF THE SOLUTIONS Revenue Autonomy
Perhaps the greatest concern with the single rate sales and use tax proposals is the eradication of an important component of local fiscal autonomy. For local government to be responsive to the needs and preferences of its community, it must have the flexibility to adjust not only the composition of its spending, but also its aggregate level of taxes (Tiebout, 1956) . This, in turn, requires some degree of revenue autonomy, at least on the margin, meaning the authority to adjust tax rates (McLure, 1997) . The power of local government to set local tax rates not only gives them the flexibility to respond to changing demands for local public services, but also provides for a degree of political accountability that is simply not possible in the absence of such control.
Although most states require that local sales taxes be applied to the same base as the state sales tax, 8 the decision whether to adopt this tax generally is left to local jurisdictions, with states allowing varying degrees of latitude on setting rates. Given 6 The complexity of the sales and use tax system contributes to the expense of conforming to a variety of sales tax laws and rules. There is a long history of calculating the cost to vendors of collecting and remitting retail sales tax. A recent examination of the costs associated with collecting the sales tax for instate vendors confirms that the costs to businesses are not insignificant and continue (Washington State Department of Revenue, 1998) . A subsequent study reports that the cost of sales tax collection for multistate firms suggests that their compliance costs are much higher than for firms operating in a single state (Cline and Neubig, 1999) 7 Only one of the 35 states (excluding DC) that have local sales taxes has a uniform local rate. On the other hand, 12 states have 10 or more different rates. 8 Exceptions generally are for the treatment of food and energy sales and/or business purchases. this flexibility to adopt a local sales tax, and in some states the ability to set rates, local jurisdictions are able to meet local revenue needs and tax preferences of their constituents. However, with a single rate, the current system of state and local sales taxes would be essentially transformed into a revenue derivation-based tax sharing scheme, thus removing a lot of local autonomy. Of course, local taxing jurisdictions would retain their existing capacity to control and adjust other tax rates or bases under a single rate scheme. Nevertheless, these alternative means for raising local government revenues do not afford the same degree of political acceptability that local sales taxes generally offer.
Debt Implications
Increasingly, local governments have funded facilities such as sports stadiums and transportation projects with longterm debt backed by local option sales taxes. For jurisdictions that would lose revenues under the one rate scheme, these revenue bonds may present a serious obstacle (Keating, 1999) . If a specific sales tax rate is legally devoted to bond financing, no legal problem would arise if the uniform sales tax rate exceeded the rate used for the bond guarantee. If, however, the imposition of a uniform sales tax resulted in a reduction in the sales tax rate guaranteed by the bond covenant, the legal implications could be severe. The specific implications would depend upon the language in the bond covenant.
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Setting the Uniform Rate Selection of the uniform local rate will be challenging. Any uniform rate below the maximum rate within a state will create winners and losers. Even choosing the maximum rate creates a dilemma because invariably, for those local governments that must raise their rates to the uniform rate, such an increase will be interpreted as a tax increase. In addition, there will be questions about what to do with the windfall that is realized, should it be rebated to citizens, used to reduce other taxes, or used to support additional or expanded services.
If the rate is set below the maximum, some local governments will lose revenue, introducing the politically charged issue of how the lost revenue will be made up. There are several options that deserve consideration.
Rely on Local Sources
Allowing local governments to make up the lost revenue is one option, albeit not a very promising one. Property taxes and increases in property taxes have become increasingly contentious, resulting in the imposition of various types of property tax limitations in a number of states (Mullins and Cox, 1995) . These limitations greatly restrict local governments' flexibility to raise revenue from this tax. A prime example is California, where Proposition 13 limits the tax rate to 1 percent, limits increases in assessed value, and gives the state control over the allocation of property tax revenue within counties. Given the current political environment, it is not reasonable to rely on the property tax as an option for local revenue flexibility in the majority of states (McGuire, 1999) .
While local income taxes provide a considerable degree of revenue flexibility for local governments, few currently are allowed this revenue option (ACIR, 1988; Fisher, 1996) . In 1996, only 3 percent of local own-source revenues were provided by income taxes, compared to approximately 10 percent for local sales and use taxes. More importantly, local income taxes are used in only 11 states, and in many cases are utilized by only a limited number of cities.
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Local income taxes may be a good way for local governments to maintain revenue autonomy following the imposition of a uniform local sales tax rate, but only in states that currently allow this local revenue option. As there is increased reliance on this tax, the tension between residence versus source based income tax systems will mount. Urban areas will be inclined to seek source-based systems to capture income earned by commuters while suburbs will prefer residence-based taxation. In other states that do not provide localities with this option, legislation authorizing local income taxes would be required. Such legislation is a big hurdle to overcome, particularly in states with no state income tax.
11 Adoption of a uniform sales tax rate would not affect the control local governments have over fines, fees, charges, and the rate on smaller taxes. However, the big three taxes (sales, property, and income) make up 94.4 percent of total local tax collections, or 89.5 percent excluding selective sales taxes. Thus, there is little hope that such charges or rates could be adjusted to overcome the reduction in the sales tax revenue stream. Moreover, the large majority of non-tax revenues stem from sources from which the extraction of additional revenues for general purposes is not a very reasonable option, e.g., public utilities.
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Clearly it appears that it would be difficult for local governments to rely on the property tax, individual income or other revenue sources to make up for revenue lost from the imposition of a revenue neutral uniform local sales tax regime. These conclusions need to be tempered by past fiscal behavior. For example, following the loss of federal aid in the 1970s and 1980s subnational governments found own source replacement funding (Gramlich, 1987) , and own source funding has mitigated the constraints placed on the local property tax (Shadbegian, 1999) .
State Government Revenue
While states could leave it to the affected localities to make up these losses, political reality suggests that states will have to find some way to hold local governments harmless. Thus, a crucial component of a sound single rate local sales tax program is an adequate provision by states for dealing with revenue gains and losses across local jurisdictions.
Revenue Sharing Schemes. One approach to hold taxing jurisdictions harmless would be for the state government to share state revenues with localities to offset any losses. The benefit of this approach is that local governments experiencing a windfall gain in revenues would not be required to share the increase in revenue. On the other hand, the state would suffer revenue losses as it transfers resources to local governments. In states that are bound by especially strict budget constraints, such revenue sharing may not be feasible. Even in the absence of fiscal constraints, politics within the state may make it difficult to provide compensation from the state coffers to localities that have lost revenue under that one rate scheme.
Base Sharing Schemes. A second option is tax base sharing, which would pool local government sales tax revenues for redistribution by the state. Once a uniform 10 County income taxes are allowed in Georgia, Kentucky, Indiana, and Maryland, but contribute a significant source of revenues only in Indiana and Maryland; local income taxes are allowed but not used in Georgia and Arkansas. 11 Seven states (Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming) do not impose an individual income tax, while two states, New Hampshire and Tennessee, tax only interest and dividend income. 12 Of course, there is no reason a priori to suggest that taxes on public services in the form of higher user charges would create more distortions than taxes on other commodities. On the contrary, most public services have been shown to have relatively low price elasticities, making them relatively attractive tax bases.
local sales tax is applied, the state government would allocate the local sales tax revenue to local governments to eliminate winners and losers. Of course only if the uniform rate is also revenue neutral could all local governments be held harmless. The benefit of this approach is that states would not be required to share their funds with localities. Local governments, however, are unlikely to relinquish any windfall without considerable battle.
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Setting the Uniform Rate at the Current Maximum Rate. Consideration may be given to setting the uniform local sales tax rate at the maximum current local option rate rather than at a local revenue-neutral rate. By construction, every jurisdiction would be held harmless by the provision and localities that gain revenues would not do so at the expense of other jurisdictions. Due and Mikesell (1994) recommend such an approach if the local sales tax is universally used and the rates are essentially uniform in a state.
The downside is that this option violates revenue neutrality. However, there are ways to maintain revenue neutrality. First, the state could reduce the state sales tax rate. This would result in a relatively large transfer of revenues from the state government to local governments as compared to that required for local governments to be held harmless with a local revenue neutral approach.
14 To maintain its net revenue the state could adjust the current intergovernmental transfer system (assuming one exists) to ensure local revenue neutrality. Local governments would see transfers from the state reduced in proportion to the gain they receive from the higher local sales tax rate. If state grants currently are earmarked for special purposes (e.g., education or transportation), provisions could be made to ensure that local governments adequately compensate the relevant programs or projects, perhaps through earmarking some portion of local sales tax collections. Second, states could require that local governments commensurately reduce revenue from other local tax sources.
Clearly state governments will have to make provisions for dealing with revenue gains and losses across jurisdictions if a uniform local sales tax scheme is to be successful. Each state will face different obstacles, and a single plan for dealing with revenue loss issues is not likely to be applicable across all states. Each state will have to balance their unique legal, political, and fiscal constraints to develop a plan that will work for their individual state.
LOCAL SALES TAXES IN FIVE STATES
In order to better understand the enormity of the challenge posed by adoption of a uniform local sales tax system across states, the current structure of local sales taxes in five states is discussed and the impact of instituting a single sales tax rate is analyzed. Table 4 begins the discussion by providing a detailed summary of the rates, number of governments using a specific tax rate, the type of option taxes used, and the relative amount of revenue generated by each rate for each of the five states studied. The data provide another dimension to the information provided in Table 3 , highlighting the complexity of rates out-of-state vendors encounter in these states. 13 Nevertheless, local sales tax base sharing programs have been successful in some states, although usually they have been used to finance specific projects or programs with benefits that extend across multiple counties or municipalities. Examples include funding of the Allegheny Regional Asset District in Pennsylvania, sports stadium districts in Wisconsin, and transit districts in Colorado, Minnesota, and Oregon. California's Proposition 11 (1998) allows more general local sales tax base sharing agreements among counties or municipalities. For details, see Zelio (1999) . 14 Given the large shift in revenue structures, this approach would likely work best in states where the range of local option sales tax rates is relatively narrow. Vendors face as few as six different sales tax rates in Tennessee and as many as 12 in New York and must keep track of these differing rates in hundreds of different taxing jurisdictions. In addition, within these rates there are a variety of options that need to be accounted for, by either the vendor or the state revenue department. In Utah, for example, there are three different combinations of option taxes that combine to equal a total local rate of 1.25, but six different local option taxes are imposed within this range and approximately 150 jurisdictions are taxed at this rate. Table 4 also underscores the central problem that is encountered when a single revenue-neutral rate replaces the variety of local rates currently in existence-redistribution of revenue among jurisdictions. 15 The table shows the percentage of population in the state subject to a specific tax rate, the type of local sales tax(es) applied, the number of jurisdictions covered by this tax rate, the percentage of the total revenue raised by these jurisdictions under the current local option sales tax structure, and the percentage that would be raised under a single-rate revenueneutral structure.
For example, currently in California 38 percent of the population, living in four jurisdictions, pays a 2.25 percent local option sales tax rate. This rate is comprised of a local option rate and a transit rate and it accounts for 43 percent of the total local sales tax revenue raised in the state. An additional 32.9 percent of California's population pays a local option and transit tax rate amounting to 1.75 percent. These nine jurisdictions levying this combined 1.75 percent local sales tax rate account for 29.7 percent of the total local sales tax revenue in the state. If California were to adopt a revenue-neutral uniform rate of 1.93 percent, the share of the total sales tax revenue accounted for by the former group of jurisdictions would decrease from 43 percent to 36.8 percent while the share in the latter jurisdictions would rise to 32.8 percent from 29.7 percent. Clearly the four jurisdictions that are forced to lower their rate from 2.25 to 1.93 will be reluctant to accept a uniform rate unless some mechanism is in place to allow them to replace the lost revenue. Conversely, the nine jurisdictions that experience a rate increase from 1.75 percent to 1.93 percent will reap a windfall in revenue.
California History and Background
California first instituted a sales tax in 1933 and set a rate of 2.5 percent, but raised the rate to 3.0 percent in 1935. Later the state lowered the rate back to 2.5 percent, and many cities responded by adopting a local sales tax, typically at a rate of 0.5 percent. By 1955, the number of cities using the sales tax had grown to 175, or 56 percent of California cities.
Problems associated with local administration of these taxes led, in 1955, to the passage of the Bradley-Burns Uniform Sales and Use Tax Law. This law, effective in 1962, created a uniform local sales tax rate of 1 percent (now at 1.25 percent) throughout California.
The majority of revenues (5 percentage points) resulting from the current state 6 percent sales tax are allocated to the state General Fund while the remaining 1 percentage point is split equally between the state's Local Revenue Fund and the Local Public Safety Fund. One-quarter percentage point of the 1.25 percent BradleyBurns local tax is allocated to the county where the sale occurs and is used to fund transportation projects. The remaining 1 percentage point is allocated to either an incorporated city or the county depending on the location of the sale.
Local jurisdictions are authorized to enact additional sales and use taxes of up to 1.5 percent in addition to the uniform statewide 7.25 percent. Since 1970, 23 of California's 58 counties have levied a local sales tax ranging from 0.125 to 1.25 percent. The majority of these taxes are earmarked for transportation purposes or other public services such as libraries, hospitals, and public safety. These taxes have grown in popularity, especially since passage of Proposition 13 in 1978. At the beginning of the 1997-98 fiscal year, there were 32 special tax districts in the state, with sales tax rates ranging from 0.125 to 0.50 percent.
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In 1997-8, total California sales and use tax revenue reached $28.14 billion consisting of $21.33 billion from the 6 percent state sales tax, $4.44 billion from the 1.25 percent Bradley-Burns rate, and $2.37 billion in special district, local-option, sales, and use taxes.
One Rate Proposal
A uniform statewide sales and use tax rate would be difficult to implement in California. Local governments have increased their reliance on local sales taxes since passage of Proposition 13. It is the only source of local tax revenue over which they have some control, which they undoubtedly would be reluctant to relinquish. Turning to the property tax to help neutralize the impacts of moving to a uniform sales tax rate is not possible in California.
Currently the statewide weighted average revenue neutral sales tax rate is 7.93 percent, a 1.93 local rate plus the 6 percent state rate.
17 If this rate were adopted statewide 51 of California's 58 counties would experience an increase in their sales tax rate while in the remaining seven counties the tax rate, and hence tax revenues, would decrease (Table 4) . Although only seven counties stand to lose revenue, these seven counties contain 46 percent of the states' population and account for over 48 percent of taxable sales. The revenue losses, thus, would be substantial, amounting to nearly $572 million, or about 2 percent of total sales tax revenue and over 8 percent of local sales tax revenue. Local sales tax revenues would decrease in large urban counties and increase in smaller rural counties due to tax rate decreases in urban counties ranging from 0.07 to 0.57 percentage points.
It would be difficult to ask counties experiencing an increase in rates to forego the increased revenues in order to compensate the losers. Local voters would not approve of increasing the local rate to 1.93 percent if they thought these revenues would be used to compensate other jurisdictions. Therefore, to hold local governments harmless, the state would have to come up with $572 million to cover the revenue losses.
Another option is to adopt a higher uniform rate that would generate smaller losses but more revenue. One possibility would be a combined state and local rate of 8.25 percent (6 percent state rate and 2.25 percent local rate). This is the current combined state and local rate that applies to over 44 percent of all taxable sales in the state and covers an area containing over 43 percent of the state's population. A uniform rate of 8.25 percent would, however, increase sales tax rates in 52 of California's 58 counties. The increase would be as much as 1 percent in 35 counties, while the rate would decrease in one county, San Francisco County, by 0.25 percent. 16 The City and County of San Francisco is included in three such special tax districts with rates totaling 1.25 percent, bringing their total combined state and local sales tax rate to 8.5 percent, the highest in the state. 17 For each of the five states we calculate a weighted average local sales rate that produces revenue roughly equal to the revenue expected under existing rates. In the state-by-state analysis a price elasticity of zero is assumed, ignoring issues about retail price reactions to tax rate changes (Poterba, 1996) .
Given that California cannot rely on the property tax as a means to ensure adoption of a higher uniform rate that is revenue neutral for local jurisdictions, the state must consider other means to eliminate winners and losers. One option is the adoption of a refundable income tax credit based on income, family size, and the applicable sales tax rate prior to adoption of the uniform rate. This credit would rebate the increased sales taxes directly to taxpayers. Based on 1998 taxable sales, approximately $1.18 billion in additional revenue would be collected from the local jurisdictions currently taxing sales at less than 2.25 percent. These revenues would fund the tax credit program. Obviously, this is not a simple option. Most likely the California Franchise Tax Board would be given the difficult task of designing and implementing an equitable and efficient tax credit program.
Another option would be to allow local jurisdictions to raise their local sales and use tax rates to a combined state and local rate of 8.25 percent. This would require approval of a two-thirds majority of taxpayers. However, the city, county, and special districts of San Francisco would lose approximately $28 million in sales tax revenue if a combined statewide rate of 8.25 percent is adopted. One possible solution to this revenue shortfall would be for the state to contribute half of San Francisco's 0.5 percent Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) tax. The revenue collected from out-of-state vendors could be allocated by the state to the various cities, counties, and special districts based on the proportion of total revenue received by each jurisdiction in the previous year rather than on the destination of the sale.
Given that California local governments are constrained with respect to the property tax, it is important that the uniform rate plan not freeze the local option sales and use tax rate. Instead, a three year moratorium could be imposed on any local option taxes that would raise the combined sales tax rate above 8.25 percent and then, after three years, the distribution of revenues could be reanalyzed and local tax initiatives entertained and a new uniform rate established.
Georgia Background
Georgia adopted its sales tax in 1951 at a rate of 3 percent, which was raised to 4 percent in 1989. The first local sales tax was implemented in 1972 in Fulton and DeKalb counties by referendum in order to finance mass transit (MARTA). Since then the state has approved four additional local sales taxes, all of which require a referendum, establish a 1 percent rate, and are countywide. The first was the local option sales taxes (LOST), adopted for the stated purpose of providing property tax relief. The revenue is split between the municipalities and the county government on the basis of a mutually agreed upon formula. Second, the special purpose local option sales tax (SPLOST) was established to finance public infrastructure, but only for the county governments. Third, the homestead option sales tax (HOST), which has been adopted only by DeKalb County, is principally used to increase the homestead exemption for county government property taxes. Finally, approval was recently given for school systems to adopt a local sales tax (EDLOST), with the revenue to be used for capital improvements to schools. In the few counties in which there are more than one school system, the revenue is shared on the basis of student enrollment. Both the SPLOST and the EDLOST have a fiveyear life, but can be renewed.
There is a restriction that the sum of the local rates for all but the EDLOST cannot exceed 2 percent. One unfortunate aspect of the state's decision in 1996 to eliminate food from the sales tax base was to keep food purchases in the base for all local sales taxes then in existence, but to exclude it for new local sales taxes, including renewals. However, when the EDLOST was approved, food was included in the base.
One Rate Option
The prospect of going to a single local sales tax rate in Georgia raises several issues. Going to a single rate to simplify the sales tax will require eliminating the differential treatment of food; simplicity suggests excluding food in order to conform to the state sales tax base. 18 Second, all but one of the local sales taxes (i.e., LOST) are earmarked, either for specific activities (rapid transit, infrastructure, homestead exemptions, or education facilities) or for specific governments (MARTA, counties, or school districts). Given the earmarking involved, it would difficult to determine how to allocate the revenue from a uniform rate among the various governments and purposes, which implicitly requires determining which current uses will be eliminated.
Third, two of the local sales taxes (SPLOST and EDLOST) are temporary. While most of the proposed renewals of SPLOST have been approved, not all have. 19 In order to maintain the uniform sales tax rate, it will be necessary to eliminate the temporary local sales taxes as options, make them permanent, or require a statewide referendum to renew them.
Fourth, there is no dominate pattern, either by population, sales tax collections, or the number of counties, in terms of the set of local sales taxes used or the set of rates (Table 4) . Sixty percent of the population face a 3 percent local, 29 percent face a 2 percent, and 11 percent face a 1 percent rate.
It would be difficult for Georgia State government to hold local jurisdictions harmless if a 2 percent or 2.5 percent rate were imposed, where 2.5 percent is the revenue neutral rate. The counties that would lose revenue under a 2.5 percent rate would experience about a 17 percent drop in revenues. To keep these counties whole would require the state to allocate about 8 percent of its sales tax revenue to these counties. For the state to hold these counties harmless would thus require a large grant program under which the state allocated funds to 98 (of the 159) counties (comprising 52.7 percent of the state's population), which would lead to concerns over equity.
A rate of 2 percent or 2.5 percent would require determining which of the local sales taxes would be retained. While every possible combination of the five local sales taxes is feasible, it makes sense to treat the LOST and MARTA as one, the SPLOST and HOST as one, and the EDLOST as one. The option that perhaps is the most feasible is to assign 1 percent to the MARTA or LOST since LOST is the only sales tax revenue that municipal governments receive, and allow the use of the other 1 percent or 1.5 percent to be determined by the voters in each county.
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The alternative is to establish a 3 percent local sales tax rate, with 2 percent applying to counties and municipalities and 1 percent applying to school districts. For the two rates that apply to counties and municipalities, one would be a LOST, 18 Bahl and Hawkins (1997) estimated based on 1996 data that eliminating food reduces sales tax revenue statewide by about 15 percent. While either including or excluding food would solve the problems of multiple tax bases, agreeing on whether to include or exclude food could be a tough political issue. Having just recently excluded food from the state sales tax base, state government may find voters opposed to adding it back. However, there is concern among some state elected officials regarding the loss of revenue that resulted from the food exemption. 19 The EDLOST is too new to have any experience with renewals, although voter approval rate for the EDLOST proposals has been nearly unanimous. 20 DeKalb County does not have a LOST so it makes sense to allow it to use a HOST for Fulton and DeKalb counties; the second 1 percent would go to MARTA.
with revenues used as they are now. For the other 1 percent rate, each county, through a referendum, could decide which of the four current local options apply. Such a decision could be revisited every three to five years, although in the case of DeKalb and Fulton counties there would be no choice of eliminating the allocation of one percent to MARTA since the sales tax is pledged to finance the bonds issued to build the system. One problem with this option is that if in the future MARTA is extended into other counties, those counties would likely have to use one of their 2 percent rates to finance MARTA. A second problem concerns the EDLOST, whose funds are dedicated to facilities improvement, not general operating costs. The likelihood of over investment in facilities means that, at some point, the earmarking of these funds will have to be discontinued. Furthermore, it is believed that there are substantial variations across the school districts in the sales tax base per student. Thus, a potential issue regarding making the EDLOST permanent is the inequities in expenditures per student that might result. On the other hand, going to 3 percent at the local level is probably the easiest to adopt politically, although opposition to it is likely to be based on the claim that it is a tax increase since several school districts will be required to adopt the EDLOST and that the currently temporary existing SPLOST and EDLOST are made permanent. It is unlikely that the state government could or would reduce its sales tax rate in order to maintain revenue neutrality. The alternative approach to maintain revenue neutrality is to require property tax reductions in counties that experience a sales tax increase. While there are some difficulties that have to be faced in adopting any of the options, it is conceivable that Georgia could adopt a uniform sales tax rate.
New York Background
While the State of New York did not institute a general sales and use tax until 1965 (with the exception of an emergency 1 percent sales tax from 1933 to 1934), counties and cities began levying sales taxes as early as 1934. 21 When the state enacted its general sales and use tax in 1965, authority was granted to counties and cities. Adoption of the local option general sales and use tax is left to the discretion of local legislative bodies subject to a maximum rate set by the state. 22 In cases when the combined sales tax rates sought by a county and a city within its jurisdiction exceed the maximum local option rate allowed, the state generally grants authority to the city to impose a rate up to half the maximum local rate allowed with the county being granted authority for the other half of the allowable rate.
From 1934 to 1940, New York City's local tax rate was 2 percent, decreasing to 1 percent during the 1941 to 1944 period, and returning to 2 percent in 1945. From 1947 through 1950 the top local rate was 2 percent, rising to 3 percent from 1951 through 1964. Since 1965, when the state instituted its own general sales and use tax, decisions about the maximum allowable rates for general local sales and use taxes have been made by the state legislature. Until 1973 the state authorized cities and counties to impose a sales tax of up to 3 percent, in increments of 0.5 percent.
In 1974, the state began to grant exceptions to the 3 percent limit. New York City and the City of Yonkers were granted authority to raise their maximum rates to 4 percent. In 1986, some cities and counties received authorization to impose special local sales tax rates of up to 1 percent, making the maximum allowable local option rate 4 percent in these cases. Finally, in 1991 the legislature granted authority to Nassau County for a maximum local rate of 4.25 percent, which the county imposed in 1996.
Generally local sales and use taxes are used for general fund purposes by counties and cities. In the case of New York City, the 4 percent local sales tax is earmarked for use by the Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC). Barring a financial emergency, these funds essentially become part of New York City's general fund.
There are also a limited number of local sales and use taxes that are earmarked for specific purposes. In 1981, twelve counties in the metropolitan New York area, comprising almost 66 percent of the state's population in 1998, had a 0.25 sales tax imposed on them by the state legislature, with the revenues designated for the Metropolitan Commuter Transportation District (MCTD).
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Approximately 95 percent of local option sales taxes went to fund general fund expenditures, 4.1 percent was earmarked for the MCTD, and the remaining 0.5 was earmarked for the Suffolk County Drinking Water Protection Program.
One Rate Proposal
If New York State adopted a uniform local sales tax rate, the most sensible rate, given the existing pattern of rates, would be 4 percent. 24 Adoption of a statewide sales tax rate of 8 percent would result in 37 counties and 11 cities raising their sales tax rates, require seven counties and four cities to lower their sales tax rates, and would leave sales tax rates unchanged in 18 counties and nine cities (Table 4 ). The local jurisdictions increasing their sales tax rates to 4 percent would generate an estimated $488 million in additional local sales taxes, almost 40 percent above current revenue levels. On the other hand, the local jurisdictions required to lower their tax rates to 4 percent would lose an estimated $313 million in revenue, or approximately 7 percent of the total sales and use taxes currently raised by these jurisdictions. The net local revenue effect of adopting a uniform 4 percent local sales tax rate would be an estimated increase of more than $175 million.
Implementing a one rate approach appears to be possible from a legal standpoint, given the control that the state historically has exercised over the range of local option tax rates jurisdictions can impose. Politically, the task appears more challenging. Local jurisdictions are accustomed to having a fair amount of autonomy over local sales tax rates; mandating one rate diminishes this flexibility.
It seems logical that a provision to protect jurisdictions from revenue loss would be a necessary component of the one rate plan. While it is practical from a fiscal point of view for the state to compensate the counties and cities that are losers, such a reallocation plan most likely would meet with substantial political resistance. The seven counties that lose revenue are located in the general New York City area. A plan to use the state general fund to 23 In 1984 Suffolk County was granted 0.25 local sales tax rate to fund the Suffolk County Drinking Water Protection Program. It also received authority, but has not yet imposed, an additional 0.25 rate for the purpose of establishing the Long Island Lighting Company Tax Certiorari Payment and Securitization Fund. Finally, Schenectady County was granted authority to impose an additional sales and use tax rate of 0.5 percent to fund the Schenectady Metroplex Development. 24 The weighted average of the existing local sales tax rates actually is 3.997.
compensate for the revenue losses of these jurisdictions will just heighten the tension that exists between "upstate" and "downstate." Using the local property tax to replace the lost revenue is not a reasonable option in New York State. In addition, replacing the lost revenue through local income taxes would be difficult because only New York City and Yonkers have authorization for a local income tax.
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The last issue with a one rate option is driven by concerns about relative prices. Five states and Canada border New York State and all five bordering states have combined sales tax rates below those in the corresponding counties in New York State. Currently, the majority of New York State counties bordering Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Vermont have combined state and local sales tax rates below 8 percent. If an 8 percent combined rate is mandated, there is the likelihood these counties will lose sales to their bordering jurisdictions. There is strong evidence that rate differentials between neighboring jurisdictions will cause a shift in retail activity (Fox, 1986) .
Tennessee History and Background
The local option sales and use tax was ushered into Tennessee in 1963; 16 years after the state first imposed the tax. Any county or incorporated city or town is authorized to levy the local option tax at a rate not exceeding 2.75 percent; however, the levy of the tax by a county precludes, to the extent of the county tax, any city or town within the county from levying the tax. A city or town may levy a tax at a rate up to the difference between the maximum 2.75 percent rate and the current county rate.
Currently every county in Tennessee imposes a local option sales and use tax, with the rates ranging from 1.50 percent to 2.75 percent. The modal value is 2.25 percent, which is imposed in 42 of Tennessee's 95 counties (Table 4) . Municipal tax rates, which range from 0.25 percent to 0.75 percent, are imposed in only 23 of Tennessee's more than 400 incorporated areas. The average combined local option sales tax rate is approximately 2.31 percent, whether weighted by population or taxable sales. Most of Tennessee's population (68 percent) faces a 2.25 percent local option sales tax rate, or a combined state-local rate of 8.25 percent. The myriad of over-lapping tax jurisdictions has created a lack of uniformity. Several communities face circumstances with three different tax rates in effect within the jurisdiction.
Fifty percent of the local option sales tax is distributed and expended in the same manner as the county property tax for education. To the extent that the tax is collected in incorporated areas, the other 50 percent is allocated to the cities and towns on a situs basis. Otherwise it is then distributed as directed by the county. Incorporated cities and towns may also contract with counties to distribute the 50 percent not allocated for school purposes by some other means.
Other than the allocation of a fixed share for school purposes, local sales and use taxes generally are not earmarked in Tennessee, with a few exceptions. First, any county, incorporated city or town, or school district entitled to receive a distri- 25 While the rate differential in the losing jurisdictions largely is due to rates for the Metropolitan Commuter Transportation District and the Suffolk County Water Protection District, it would not be feasible, at least in the former case, to raise user fees to make up the lost revenue. Higher user fees would deter people from using public transportation in the district. And, raising user fees in the district would be unfair to people living in the five counties that do not lose under the one rate proposal. Raising user fees for users in the district would penalize the non-loser areas twice by forcing them to raise their local sales tax rates to 4 percent and also pay higher user fees to help compensate for the lost sales tax revenue from the areas that would be forced to reduce their tax rates.
bution of local sales and use tax proceeds is allowed to pledge those proceeds for payment of interest and principal on debt. Secondly, sales taxes collected from admissions, concessions, parking fees, etc. from professional sports events are earmarked for exclusive use of the relevant sports authority. 26 Finally, a 1998 law provides that any incremental increase in state and local sales tax revenues derived from a tourism development zone (adjusted for growth in the base prior to establishing the zone) is to be distributed to the relevant municipality exclusively for payment of the cost of public use facilities within the tourism development zone.
One Rate Proposal
A revenue neutral uniform local sales and use tax rate for Tennessee would be approximately 2.3 percent, which would result in a combined state-local rate of 8.3 percent.
27 At this rate, over 75 percent of Tennesseans would face a higher sales and use tax rate, although for most (89 percent) the change would be a relatively small 0.05 percent. Losses to counties and municipalities with currently higher local rates would amount to approximately $34.9 million.
28 Another option would be to set the uniform local tax rate at 2.25 percent. In that case only 8.4 percent of the population would face a higher tax rate, but revenue losses would increase to approximately $40.5 million ($32.0 million net).
Political reality suggests that lost revenues would have to be transferred to the loser counties and municipalities from state revenue coffers, as revenue gainers could not be expected to readily hand over the increased collections. 29 This transfer may present a major obstacle in Tennessee, despite the relatively small amount as a share of the state's budget. The problem is a current fiscal crisis that has left Tennessee with a $382 million shortfall for fiscal year 2001. While the Governor has been pushing for comprehensive tax reform that, among other changes, would institute a broad based income tax and raise additional revenues to cover the projected shortfall, the effort appears to have little chance for success.
30 If the state continues with the status quo, a $34.9 million transfer to local governments will be contentious at best, but probably impossible.
If a hold-harmless transfer from the state is not possible, an alternative plan would set the uniform local sales and use tax rate at the current maximum 2.75 percent. The problem with this alternative is that virtually the entire state (99.4 percent) would face higher sales and use tax rates, some by as much as 1.25 percent, and local governments would raise an additional $229.1 million in revenues. Revenue neutrality could be maintained by instituting a commensurate reduction in the state rate and making up the lost revenue through the intergovernmental transfer mechanism (the state rate would fall to approximately 5.6 percent, and thus the 26 Currently this provision applies only to the City of This rate is slightly lower than the revenue neutral rate, which would be 2.3112 percent. The net loss in revenues (losses less revenue gains) would be $5.9 million. Local revenue losses would amount to $33.6 million at the truly revenue-neutral rate. 28 Calculated using the 1998 revenue base and current (December, 1999) tax rates, excluding out-of-state transactions calculated at the optional uniform state rate of 8.25 percent. 29 They could, however, be reasonably required to reduce property taxes by the amount of the gain. While local governments in Tennessee do not appear to be as factitious as they are in many other states, base-sharing arrangements still are likely to be met with insurmountable political resistance. 30 The state legislature ended its session without acting on the plan, although a special session to reconsider the bill is possible. The key component of the plan is to impose a broad-based income tax of 3.75 percent and to lower the state sales and use tax rate from its current 6 percent to 3.75 percent. There are some issues of potential concern, however, including (1) the allocation of revenues between counties and the municipalities within those counties, (2) the use of local sales tax revenue bonds, and (3) local revenue flexibility. The Tennessee Code gives counties precedence for local option taxes and allows counties and municipalities to contract for alternative distributions of the amount not allocated for school purposes. A simple and legally viable solution to the distribution problem, then, would be to make the singlerate local sales tax a county tax. Each county would have the discretion to enter into agreements with the municipalities contained therein as necessary to keep the relevant budgets viable. A more formidable problem is presented by the revenue bonds; either the rates assigned to the revenue bonds will have to be maintained, or the state will have to find an alternative revenue source. Finally, with a single rate local sales and use tax, property tax rates will be the only remaining option for local revenue flexibility. Given the difficulty the State of Tennessee has had in instituting a broad-based individual income tax, a local option income tax simply is not feasible and probably never will be. If Tennesseans are especially resistant to property taxes, local governments are likely to find themselves much more constrained in times of fiscal difficulty.
Utah History and Background
In 1960, 37 years after Utah adopted a retail sales tax, Utah cities were allowed to impose a general purpose local option sales tax piggybacked on the state base and administered by the State Tax Commission. Unlike local option taxes in other states, its adoption does not require a referendum. However, all decisions about rates are controlled by the State Legislature. The local rate has been altered four times, three increases and one decrease, and is now 1.25 percent. The base of this tax is partially shared. The tax collected is allocated 50 percent on point of sale and the other half into a common pool and distributed on a per capita basis in each county. Now, 40 years after being approved, the local option sales tax is used by all Utah cities and is also the dominant source of tax revenue in the majority of cities. Since 1980 its rate of growth has exceeded the rate of growth of the state income tax and the local property tax.
In 1975, cities in urban counties were allowed to seek voter approval of a second local option sales tax to fund mass transit. 31 Only about 15 percent of Utah cities currently use the mass transit tax, but these cities represent 85 percent of the state population. In the past five years, four additional local option sales taxes have been granted by the legislature. 31 Utah has several local option taxes that are imposed on tourist related activities, e.g., car rentals and surcharges on sales in resort areas. We did not consider the implications of these taxes because their revenue impact is small.
Three of these, rural hospital (1997), rural highways (1998) and cultural support (1998), require voter approval. The fourth, a county option tax (1998), does not require voter approval, but if adopted, the county must make a corresponding reduction in the property tax. Only four rural counties (out of 29 total counties), each of which has large industrial or resource components in their property tax base, have not opted to use the county option tax. Except for the option tax to support cultural activities, ratified in Salt Lake County, the recent option taxes have gone unused except in a few rural areas. Nevertheless, the discretion of having numerous local option sales taxes creates the potential for multiple sales tax rates within the State, and in fact, nonuniformity has become the norm in Utah.
Total revenue for the various local option taxes exceeds $430 million and their annual growth has exceeded 7 percent for the past eight years. The majority of the revenue from the local option sales taxes is used to fund general government expenditures. For example, city and county option sales taxes comprise about threequarters of the local sales tax revenue. The remaining 25 percent of the local option sales taxes are earmarked, primarily for urban transit. Ninety percent of local option taxes are collected in taxing jurisdiction comprising just over 60 percent of the total state population (Table 4 ). Not shown in Table 4 , but as might be expected, roughly 80 percent of the revenue from the local option taxes is remitted from four counties that are economically and physically linked to Salt Lake County.
One Rate Proposal
The revenue neutral uniform local rate is 1.55 percent, and when added to the state rate of 4.75, yields a combined rate of 6.30 percent. This rate would increase the tax rate in 200 taxing jurisdictions, but lower the tax rate in the most populous county. One issue complicates consideration of a one-rate sales tax in Utah. The State Constitution prohibits vertical revenue sharing and a change that causes a direct transfer of funds collected by the state to local governments could be challenged.
In order to achieve revenue neutrality, a provision to protect local governments from revenue loss would be a necessary part of any realistic proposal. Fortunately, overcoming shortfalls is not an insurmountable issue in Utah. Rural areas, representing a small portion of total population, would face shortfalls of about $26 million and the state could absorb this amount of funding given its current financial condition. The base sharing aspects of the local option tax would make the process of holding taxing jurisdictions harmless easy to implement.
In a concession to political reality, cities and counties experiencing a gain from the higher tax rate would not be asked to forego the increase. However, it is reasonable to require the governments gaining from the higher sales tax rate to reduce their property tax.
Allowing local governments to take a credit against the taxes imposed by the state solves the Constitutional prohibition against vertical revenue sharing.
32 However, this approach raises the question of making everyone whole. There is also the question of how the new revenue would be used. The legislature must decide if governments that have opted not to impose some local option taxes, such as a county sales tax or a rural road tax, could only use revenue as if they had adopted such taxes. This is clearly a political decision. In terms of the funding to prevent revenue losses it obviously would come from the state but would be modest. The total cost is around $50 million, or about 1.9 percent of the state sales tax revenue collected during the previous fiscal period. The resulting distribution of the local option sales tax under this approach is reported in Table 4 .
This approach does have the complication of lowering the sales tax in Salt Lake County from 6.35 percent to 6.3 percent, while increasing the sales tax in a number of other counties. For most of the residents experiencing a rate increase the change would be from 6.25 percent to 6.30 percent. There is every reason to expect this shift would create political friction between urban and rural legislators.
There are a series of possible responses to this problem. The uniform rate could be set at 6.25 percent, or the rate could be set at 6.3 initially and then reduced in increments. The potential of lower overall rates would be based on the expectation that the state sales tax base would be broadened by the inclusion of use tax transactions that now escape taxation. The loss to Salt Lake County of using a 6.25 rate would be $10 million and the total loss in the state would be $15 million.
CONCLUSIONS
The sales tax has become a significant source of revenue to local governments in many states. The resulting intra-state pattern of sales taxes is complex, with a wide range of rates and a diversity of purposes. It is this complexity that led the NTA Project to propose that states adopt a single sales tax rate. However, our analysis of the feasibility of implementing such a proposal suggests that in the current environment, adoption of a single rate would in general be difficult and simply unfeasible in many if not most states.
There are essentially three reasons for this conclusion. First and foremost, the loss of local fiscal autonomy would seem to be an insurmountable obstacle in many states. In states like New York, Colorado, Pennsylvania, California, and Alabama, local governments have significant control over setting the tax rate. Even in states such as Georgia, where the state has set the local rate at 1 percent, there are multiple local options, so that governments within any county can adopt one of three rates.
In many states property tax limitations have reduced or eliminated local fiscal control over the property tax rate. Therefore, in many states adoption of a uniform rate would require state government to play a much greater role in financing local governments. Or, as an alternative, states will have to be willing to give local governments control over other sources of revenues, such as local income taxes. In either case, a proposal to eliminate local autonomy over the local sales tax rate through a single state sales tax rate most likely would meet heavy resistance.
Second, it is likely the only politically acceptable approach to instituting a uniform sales tax rate is for the rate to be revenue neutral and local governments to be held harmless. Given these constraints, a uniform rate is not feasible in most states. Adoption of a revenue neutral weighted average of existing local sales tax rates will require the sales tax rate to be raised in some jurisdictions and lowered in others. Both changes will be politically unpopular. The former will face resistance from voters who are opposed to tax increases, specifically an increase in the local sales tax. Conversely a lowering of the sales tax rate will be opposed by local government officials, who will be forced to look for replacement revenues or be forced to reduce services. These officials must be accountable to voters who are inclined to resist any attempt to raise other taxes and fees, even if the purpose is solely to generate replacement revenue. Even attempts at the state level to transfer revenues in order to maintain revenue neutrality likely are to meet stiff resistance. Programs that transfer sales tax revenue from current low rate jurisdictions to current high rate jurisdictions will be opposed by localities that are unwilling to share the windfall from higher rates with other jurisdictions in the state. These localities will be inclined to want to use the windfall to buy more or expanded services or to reduce other taxes and fees. Similarly, state government grant programs that hold jurisdictions harmless will be very difficult to sell. There will be a reluctance among state legislators to use the state general fund to make losing jurisdictions whole, especially when the winners and losers represent traditional diametrically opposed groups, such as urban versus rural areas.
Third, there are complexities to local sales taxes beyond those associated with rates. For example, some sales tax revenue, as in the case of Georgia's MARTA, is pledged as the source of revenue to pay bonds. Any legislation to change rates in order to adopt a uniform rate would have to include provisions to meet debt service obligations tied to local sales taxes or the credit rating of the affected localities and the state will be adversely affected. Similarly, many local sales taxes are earmarked for special districts, which have no other source of tax revenue, or for special purposes or needs which are temporary. Any plan to implement a uniform local sales tax rate would have to account for these constraints, which clearly adds substantial complexity.
In conclusion, without significant changes in the fiscal environment (including current limits on the fiscal autonomy of local governments), it does not appear that adoption of a uniform sales tax is a feasible option for most states. Nonetheless, the growth in direct mail marketing and e-commerce suggests that a way must be found to simplify the local sales tax.
Perhaps if the loss of sales tax revenue from e-commerce becomes great enough, states will have sufficient incentive to work to overcome the constraints inherent in the implementation of a uniform rate. In the meantime, the search for alternatives should continue. One option that deserves closer scrutiny is the tworate proposal-preserving the current rates and levying one rate for in-state sales and one rate for out-of-state sales. As is the case with the one rate proposal, there are issues associated with the tworate proposal that have to be resolved. These issues include the commerce clause issue, possible differential tax rate for those from whom a use tax can and cannot be collected, and the basis for distributing the revenue to local governments. One approach to this suggestion is to not apply the use tax to local option sales taxes.
Another alternative worthy of consideration is adoption of a set of sales tax rates that reduce local fiscal autonomy, but do not eliminate it. For example, rates might be made uniform across counties or groups of counties. This approach would be easy to implement in states like California and Utah. Both of these options seem, on their surface, to have greater viability than the one-rate option. Finally, state and local governments, in cooperation with commercial and industrial concerns and multistate vendors, should make every effort to develop technological solutions to resolve the complexity associated with multiple rates.
